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A sufficient and steady stream of innovations is widely seen as a basis for healthy modern
economies. Governments divert substantial resources from other purposes in society to
increase innovation. Yet the failure rate among innovative SMEs is high, suggesting that
resources are wasted. Avoiding such waste is a challenge for both governments and investors,
but also raises a question for the innovative company, namely how to build and fund the
enterprise on an ethical basis. The dilemma of giving in to temptations to ‘cut corners’ clearly
exists, for example to exploit the inevitable asymmetry of information arising in innovation
and potentially deploy this in support of misleading claims about specific capabilities and/or
the unjustified creation and exploitation of reputation. This is consistent with Olaf Fisscher’s
finding that entrepreneurs starting new ventures tend to exhibit an inherent bias towards
compromising their own values in order to succeed at any cost. When the innoSME’s aspira-
tions are unrealistic or the proposed innovations are of marginal value, the ethical issues are
broader and extend also to those who are potential financiers. Noting this as a gap in the ethics
literature, we argue that the current situation fails to match economic and ethical ideals and
that work is needed to develop tools which allow those who provide finance and support for
innovation to target it more effectively at those who have a prospect of successfully launching
genuine innovations and thus reduce the ‘noise’ in the innovation field.
Introduction
It has long been widely recognized that a suf-ficient and steady stream of innovations
is required for the sustainability of modern
economies (Schumpeter & Opie, 1934; Aghion
&Griffith, 2008). This dependsupon innovative
companies being able to generate good returns
from their efforts and on investors (or govern-
ments) being successful in their efforts to direct
resources to the innovative companies that can
best make use of them. However, the failure
rate among innovative SMEs (innoSMEs) is
high (Luo&Mann, 2011). In this paperwe focus
on the relationship of innoSMEs with sources
of finance (investors or governments) and
explore how the information asymmetry that is
inherent in the nature of innovation means that
investors and government agencies are at risk
of being misled – whether deliberately or
not – and entrepreneurs are at risk of slipping
into unethical behaviour.
The results of such deception – or failure by
investors to deal adequately with information
asymmetry – are evident in the numerous
examples of innoSMEs which receive funding
and fail. We consider themechanisms relied on
to overcome the penalty of information asym-
metry and in particular the potential for SMEs’
efforts usingmechanisms such as reputation to
result in the misallocation of resources in inno-
vation support regimes. We argue that there is
an ethical as well as an economic imperative to
counter this, since the resources could be better
applied elsewhere, the openness of investors
and society to innovations is reduced and there
is much personal pain involved in pursuing
business start-ups that fail.
We raise the question whether it is possible
for investors to recognize earlier and better
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innovative SMEs whose poor prospects are
disguised by misleading information (deliber-
ate if not false). To illustrate this, we consider a
typology which emerged from a performance
analysis of a sample of 120 innoSMEs, part of a
wider piece of research into the evaluation of
investment strategies (Millar & Udalov, 2011).
This highlights the problem of how to avoid
encouraging (through finance) those which
have minimal prospects of success; they take
up evaluation resources not to mention finance
and can therefore be seen as causing ‘noise’ in
the system.
The consequence of conscious or uncon-
scious misleading of investors is that poten-
tially successful companies miss out on
necessary funding. It also contributes to the
high overall failure rate of innovative SMEs and
webelieve that this in turn erodes confidence in
investment in innovation, resulting in higher
financing costs and greater public scepticism.
Our conclusion is that the information
asymmetry that is inherent in the innovation
context creates a temptation for unethical
behaviour and that reputation ceteris paribus is
an inadequate basis for making investment or
purchasing decisions. The typology of innova-
tive SMEs we have developed highlights the
groups which may benefit from ignoring this,
and underpins the view that it can lead to an
allocation of resources which breaches the
objective of maximum sustainability. Further
research may throw light on the early warning
signs that can indicate probable failure and
help counteract rent-seeking through reputa-
tional hype.
The objective of this paper is, through
addressing a lesser covered part of the ethics
literature, to position information asymmetry
as a central problem in achieving a fair distri-
bution of innovation support, and to empha-
size that efforts to overcome this have ethical
dimensions as well as economic ones. The
intrinsic information asymmetry can be
exploited and the entrepreneur’s method of
seeking funding has ethical dimensions; those
who fund and encourage entrepreneurs thus
also need to be aware of whether their input is
contributing to an ethically unacceptable
outcome.
Our research addresses a gap in the litera-
ture in that academic attention to ethical chal-
lenges facing innovative entrepreneurs tends
to focus on issues such as attitude to ethics
(e.g., Christensen, Schwartz & Hoss, 2008), or
on the extent and motivation for behaviour in
specific areas of potential illegality such as
intellectual property rights, insider informa-
tion and money-raising practices (e.g., Fassin,
2000). By contrast our discussion highlights
how a specific aspect of the environment of the
innovative firm generates specific ethical chal-
lenges; these emerge because entrepreneurs
develop tools and techniques which will help
them to communicate what they wish – and to
conceal what they wish to hide; with such
mechanisms available to them there is a
natural temptation for:
1. misrepresentation by way of ‘hype’ in rela-
tions with stakeholders, especially inves-
tors and grant givers,
2. manipulative exploitation of reputation and
reputational networks,
3. appropriation of resources that could be
better deployed elsewhere, thus reducing
the benefit of these resources to society.
We also note that the activities of enthusiastic
innovator-entrepreneurs may also be ethically
questionable when they result in:
1. helping establish as the norm the pursuit of
quick returns, i.e. excess and rapid ‘rents’
arising from the innovations; such a norm is
of debatable value and may undermine the
position of those who expect reward only
for steady patient effort, and
2. avoidable pain and suffering, including
financial, to those who devote their time
and allegiance to innovative enterprises that
have only a marginal chance of success.
Perspective
As noted above, most western countries accept
that small and medium-sized enterprises are a
key source of innovations and see it as impor-
tant to channel funding to them, by encourag-
ing venture capital (VC) investment and bank
loans, by making grants or offering tax conces-
sions. It is important that this transfer of
resources benefits those SMEs whose busi-
nesses are sustainable sources of valuable
innovations and hence it is important that
investors are able to judge which these are.
A solid policy for innovation depends upon
success in such identification and, as innova-
tions are implicitly experience, credence or
societal (Darby & Karni, 1973; Millar, 2004)
goods, this depends on how investors deal
with information asymmetry.
The desired stream of innovations is depen-
dent on individuals and organizations taking
decisions of two sorts, either to seek invest-
ment or to provide funds. Those faced with
these decisions may see them as ethically
neutral but in fact the decisions have more
than economic consequences. There are social
consequences which flow from the success or
failure of innovative enterprise, and adding to
the extent of these is not an ethically neutral
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matter. Nor is the behaviour of those seeking
funding. Furthermore, in broad socio-
economic terms, there are issues about how
resources are allocated and about what sort of
society is created; for example, one with an
emphasis on rapid accumulation of wealth is
different from one with more conservative
values.
In considering such issues it is important to
clarify what we mean by innovation and the
key perspectives wewill adopt. One of the first
economists to pay attention to the crucial role
of innovation was Schumpeter, who also
coined the phrase ‘disruptive innovation’. He
pointed out the difference between new or
improved products, new production tech-
niques, new markets and new ways to orga-
nize the business (Schumpeter & Opie, 1934).
In a concise form this was repeated by
Freeman who clarified the concept of an inno-
vation as: ‘An innovation in the economic sense
is accomplished only with the first commercial
transaction involving the new product,
process, system or device, although the word
is also used to describe the whole process’
(Freeman & Soete, 1997). As it contains a bal-
anced combination of technology, economics
and business we will adopt this definition and
also bear in mind that ‘it is a serious mistake to
treat an innovation as if it were a well-defined,
homogeneous thing that could be defined as
entering at a precise date or becoming avail-
able at a precise point in time’ (Kline & Rosen-
berg, 1986).
Innovation is thus a process in society; it
presents the actors involved – entrepreneurs,
financiers, customers – with the question
whether what they are doing is ethical. We
focus on the relationship between the innova-
tive company and its sources of finance –
which we usually term ‘investors’, but include
both those who provide equity or loans and
those (e.g., government agencies) who provide
grants or incentives through the tax regime.
Attention to ethics requires not only a consid-
eration of the innovation itself but also of how
society’s resources are allocated. While most
comment on this relates to allegedly excessive
levels of new product introduction, we believe
that attention also needs to be given to the
impact of abortive investments, many of
which never even reach the public.
Thus there are wider ethical aspects to the
situations that arise. We do not believe that
the differences among the variety of ethical
systems proposed in a business context make a
great difference to our observations, but for the
sake of clarity we shall work with a ‘rule-
utilitarian’ ethic which places the highest value
on the achievement of outcomes beneficial to
human society, but combines this with the
need to seek out rules of conduct and which
thereby ‘does a better job than its rivals of
matching and tying together our moral convic-
tions, as well as offering us help with our
moral disagreements and uncertainties’
(Hooker, 2000).
What makes for Successful
Innovation?
Fundamental to an understanding of how
innovation operates is the answer to the simple
question: ‘Why do people (try to) innovate?’.
The simple answer is because they want to
obtain an advantage: a competitive advantage
that allows them to beat business rivals,
and/or a social or personal advantage, which
in the case of a technology-based firm may
very well be psychological satisfaction for
those behind the innovation(s). The measure of
such advantage will be benefits to the innova-
tor (Schumpeter & Opie, 1934). For this reason
innovators typically protect their intellectual
property (IP) rights and know-how; they own
the innovation and can either apply and imple-
ment it or drop it. Even despite patent protec-
tion, the innovator in an SME1 will normally
release only as much information about how
the innovation is achieved as is necessary (Jeon
& Menicucci, 2008). We recognize that some
academics as well as businessmen advocate
the concept of ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough,
2003), originally introduced in the 1960s.
However, as evidenced by the cases covered in
a Special Issue of R&D Management (Enkel,
Gassmann & Chesbrough, 2010), this is a trend
that has yet to become dominant, i.e., the
majority of both the business community and
investors still support the closed innovation
approach which is hence the paradigm in our
analysis. For such situations there is an inher-
ent driver to maintain the position in which
the innoSME ‘knows the secret’ and it remains
less well understood by the external environ-
ment, including (potential) investors. For the
investor it is important to predict, before
making a commitment, whether an innovation
will be successful; the risk is that otherwise
time, money and commitment devoted to the
innovation will be wasted. In the case of inno-
vative SMEs, the success of the firm and
the success of the innovation are intimately
connected.
It is well established that for innovation (and
the company that brings innovation to life) to
be successful, a combination of qualities has
to be present in both internal and external
environments (Bartoloni, 2011). Griffith and
Webster (2010) attempted to estimate the sepa-
rate effects of internal versus external environ-
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mental factors on R&D activity; to this must be
added the issue of timing on which Forsythe
and Khormaei (2011) write explicitly: ‘A key
failure mode for businesses of all sizes is appli-
cation of an otherwise good innovation strat-
egy at the wrong time’.
We posit that in order to succeed, the
innoSME should possess all of the following
internal competencies and advantages:
1. The brilliant idea, including technological
(scientific) advantage and competencies.
2. Business and management advantage and
competencies.
3. Financial advantage and competencies.
At the same time, the company should be
embedded in an environment that provides it
with supportive external advantages, and the
innovation must take place
4. at the right time, in the right place, and
within the right competitive environment.
If all these four boundary conditions are ful-
filled, such a company is in a position to
succeedwith a possibly ground-breaking inno-
vation. Such a combination of conditions is,
however, very rare, and one of the biggest
problems for investors is that this comes to light
not when the innovation proposal is brought to
them, but onlywhen it has become a success.A
sustainable policy for innovation depends
upon success in such identification and we
submit that understanding and dealing with
the barriers that prevent such identification can
contribute to successful investment. We there-
fore consider the issue of information asymme-
try which is such a barrier.
Information Asymmetry in the
Innovation Arena
‘Information asymmetry’ manifests itself in a
transaction situation whenever the value of a
product or service cannot be determined
without trying, sampling or experiencing the
good. Although ‘information asymmetry’
applies to any such good (e.g., raw diamonds;
Berger & Herstein, 2012), it is especially rel-
evant to knowledge transfer (Millar, 2004),
where the buyer cannot assess in advance
what the knowledge transferred is worth. We
posit that innovative products and the propo-
sition of investing in a business that will
depend on innovation are similarly hard for
potential buyers or investors to assess and
value, since the original and innovative aspects
of the value of the innovation in practice are
not observable by the investor while the busi-
ness is only at the planning stage. This situa-
tion is similar to any knowledge transfer
involving experience, judgement, intuition,
insights and values. Not only is the buyer of an
innovative product or service facing incom-
plete and often asymmetric information about
the product being transferred, he needs to
use/experience it, i.e., embed it in the context
of his own internal environment (Millar, 2004),
and in this respect the investor is in a similar
position to the customer or buyer.
Lin, Geng and Whinston (2005) researched
the information structure of knowledge
markets and the impact of information asym-
metry on knowledge transfers, and proposed
mechanisms to overcome the information
asymmetry for effective communication. In a
sense the product that is on offer from an
innoSME, be it a tangible product or a service,
also has the intangible characteristic of being
innovative. Building on the research of Lin,
Geng and Whinston, research and mapping
out the information structure of sender–
receiver in a marketing context, i.e., from mar-
keter to customer, Millar (2004) developed a
matrix covering that intangible element. This
matrix has been adapted in Figure 1 for the
current relationship between the InnoSME
and the investor. This matrix gives rise to four
different cases, clockwise:
• Field 1: Both the InnoSME and the investor
are well informed about the value of the
offering: it is a case of ‘common knowledge’
(Aumann, 1976). This applies to most search
goods; however, branding and other non-
market activities will make a difference
affecting purchase behaviour.
• Field 2: The investor knows the value of the
offering, but the innovator does not. This is
rare but does happen; tragic cases see the
light sometimes in the art and antiques
markets, at times the investor has better
market knowledge than the innovator, and
Figure 1. Asymmetry Matrix
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a further famous example is when Bill Gates
bought the DOS operating system from a
Seattle programmer for $50,000.
• Field 4: Neither the innovator nor the inves-
tor knows the true value of the offering –
this is a real case of incomplete information,
and applies to a new category of goods, the
category of ‘societal’ goods.
• Field 3: The innovator knows the value and
the investor does not. This is the normal
case of asymmetric knowledge, and applies
to most credence goods. Innovations can
often be seen as credence goods.
In the case of investments in innovations,
asymmetry is especially present because
1. the true ‘quality’ of what is purchased/
invested in may only become apparent after
the innovation has settled in through adop-
tion and repeated use,
2. there are typically no similar products/
services which can be used as a benchmark
– whether for price or characteristics, and
3. very often the basis of the innovation is
something sophisticated into the validity or
value of which the investor has no insight.
An example of failure in the first category
could be nylon bed sheets – which, in spite of
their positive points on ease of washing and
speed of drying, turned out not to be such a
good innovation due to extensive problems
when in use.
Temptations arising from
Information Asymmetry
As early as the 1990s, Nayyar (1993) pointed to
the opportunity for firms to profit from infor-
mation asymmetry in the case of experience
services. As argued above, information asym-
metry also affects the relationships between
innovative SMEs and those whose resources
are used to launch or sustain them. Investors
provide capital and governments and their
agencies provide support, tax concessions and
sometimes loans or grants. As noted, the
problem of information asymmetry is particu-
larly acute in the case of experience or cre-
dence goods/services (Darby & Karni, 1973;
Nayyar, 1993). The relationship between the
innoSME and potential investors is similar to
that of an experience service seller and cus-
tomer – with the investor being the provider of
money and the SME being the provider of a
service in the form of a share in the success of
the innovation(s).
Due to information asymmetry investors are
at risk of being deceived –whether deliberately
or not – about what the innovative SME is
capable of achieving. Information asymmetry
makes it difficult for investors and govern-
ments to be sure they are directing their
support to SMEs that have genuine potential.
With capital and support being limited
resources it is important to avoid the available
investment and support being diverted from
the most promising innovators to those
with less ability, poorer prospects, minor/
superficial innovations or fewer scruples.
Proprietorial secrecy about how innovations
are achieved and how the company will be run
constitutes a major barrier to those who wish
to predict success. The only information that
tends to be available is selective information
about the company and subjective information
about the innovation and its expected impact
as published by the company. The question for
investors is therefore to what extent it is pos-
sible to use information from and about the
company to gauge the (market) prospects of
the innovation and the survival chances of
the company. The question for the company,
however, is how it can control the information
flow so as to maximize its ability to raise the
funds it sees as desirable and this may involve
concealing investor-deterring weaknesses,
whether in the innovation or in the company
itself.
In dealings with potential investors inno-
SMEs therefore deploy techniques to control
information flows. Academic papers that con-
sider information asymmetry in this context
are apt to claim that the value of their findings
includes the assistance they give to the entre-
preneur to improve his/her success rate in
acquiring funds, e.g., Kuratko and Brown
(2010) who ‘propose that these ventures are
driven by a “quest for legitimacy” and that life
sciences entrepreneurs therefore must be
aware of the strategic issues which impact
legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders
(e.g., investors)’.
The ability of innoSMEs to use these
and other approaches effectively and secure
funding despite weaknesses that, if recog-
nized, would have deterred investors, emerges
from the results of a performance analysis of
innoSMEs in the US and Europe that did
secure funding for their innovation, in which
companies were classified and a typology was
developed reflecting the appropriateness of
their having been funded (Millar & Udalov,
2011).
Typology
There are many fortuitous and random factors
which may cause a company to fail, and there
are unforeseeable factors that contribute to
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success. However, there are also factors that
are known to be causes of failure – parti-
cularly lack of the competencies discussed
earlier – and which should therefore convince
investors to refuse funds and to advise entre-
preneurs to find other avenues for their
ambitions. To illustrate the thesis of this paper,
we consider the results of part of a research
project undertaken by Millar and Udalov
(2011) to contribute to the identification of
such situations. This encompassed a perfor-
mance analysis of 120 companies that were
successful in raising finance in Europe and the
US (including both VC funding and significant
grants).
While successes were easily recorded, fail-
ures, mismanagement and lack of competen-
cies were harder to uncover. Using criteria
from the management literature, the compa-
nies were divided into five types which were
labelled as shown in Figure 2. The data con-
firmed the importance of the characteristics
identified in the literature cited above and spe-
cifically that large numbers of innoSMEs who
fail do not meet the four boundary conditions
in at least one respect.
Those companies which did not appear to
have any of the causes of failure we have called
‘Type I’, or ‘The real McCoy’ companies. There
are only very few of these; however, they
attract publicity and ‘followers’ often ‘line up’
to try to emulate these leaders so it is impor-
tant to avoid confusing companies that are
merely followers with the ‘real McCoy’ com-
panies. We trust that a typology which points
to the characteristics of those companies which
are not of ‘real McCoy’ standard can form the
basis for an assessment algorithm that saves
wasted resources.
With the exception of Type 1 companies, all
types fall down on one or often more of the
first three boundary conditions indicated
above; we will explain type by type below,
and indicate where else they fail. The relative
size of the groups as observed in our sample
of 120 was as follows: innoSMEs of Type I
constitute less than 1 per cent; Type II make
up around 5–7 per cent, as do Type IV com-
panies. Type III is a larger group, of about 20
per cent, but by far the largest group is Type
V, the not-so-innovative majority of 65 per
cent of innoSMEs.
Whilst Type I companies are rather unique
and the real kings of innovation, they are sur-
rounded by a larger cohort of Type II compa-
nies, the ‘Aspirants’ that have almost made
it, almost got there. They might positively
answer to even three of the conditions listed
above, e.g., the right idea and/or technology
and good financing, but with poor leadership
or poor marketing.
We have called Type III companies ‘Innocent
copycats’; rather than having their own inno-
vative ideas, they try to imitate the innovators
and their innovations. In fact, the Type III
group is a loose collection of subgroups, many
of them follow the crowd, jump on the various
bandwagons and are very sensitive to most
current hypes and trends in business, in
society, etc.
What distinguishes Type IV companies from
Type II and III is that they are less interested in
real innovation, only in being in (often subsi-
dized) business. We call them ‘Guilty copycats’
and they represent a not very large but none-
theless very important group due to their
modus operandi – hit and run, with one big dif-
ference: they do not run but continue to
consume money from government and inves-
tors; and where they manage to get their
shares listed on the stock exchange, their
menu is even expanded with money from
private and institutional shareholders. We
believe these companies seriously exploit the
information asymmetry and fall down on cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) and ethical
behaviour.
While there are only a few Type IV innoS-
MEs, the large majority of SMEs claiming to be
innovative is in the last group, Type V, which
Figure 2. A Classification of Innovative SMEs
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we call ‘Plankton’. While they may have a few
of the characteristics for success, they lack so
many that they have little prospect of success.
They have a very negative influence on the
processes of innovation. Together with the
Type IV companies, they call into question
the innovation process and the quality of inno-
vations. Their ability to attract funds is not
based on realistic prospects; however, in an
environment where much effort is being put
into supporting innovation and/or betting on
potential rather than achievement, many such
firms can survive. Dealing with them con-
sumes time and attention, the result of which
is similar to that of ‘noise’ in a circuit or
system. Wittingly or unwittingly, such SMEs
undermine the trust of venture capitalists and
of both private and institutional investors in
the very concept of innovation as such, and
make all investments appear more risky.
This typology and the quantification we
report – albeit exploratory and anecdotal –
ought to reinforce the alertness of investors
and governments to targeting their financial
support on those who have least likelihood of
failing. Given the strengths of Type I compa-
nies, the optimum decision might be to help
other types compensate for their deficiencies,
and with limited resources the best return
would be expected from helping Type II com-
panies. The question arises how the other
types manage to secure financing despite the
defects in their capabilities and prospects.
We posit that a reason for this state of affairs
is that in the innovation environment compa-
nies use, but are also able to misuse, a potent
tool in the form of concealment behind
information asymmetry and self-promotion
through reputation.
Use and Abuse of Information
Asymmetry and Reputation
Various factors have been identified as signifi-
cantly facilitating the ability of innoSMEs to
attract investment. Shane and Cable (2002)
point to the role of social ties in securing
finance for innovators, concluding that ‘these
ties influence the selection of ventures to fund
through a process of information transfer.’ In
doing so they reject models of investment
decisions based on social obligation as ‘over-
socialized’; they see the key factor as being the
information transfer that is facilitated by the
social ties.
However, in a situation of information
asymmetry, particularly of a technical or intan-
gible nature, the existence of ties does not
result in the potential investor receiving
and understanding the information that is
required. While the ties may engender trust –
as suggested below – they do not as such
convey information and at best provide a
means for posing additional questions and
receiving reassurance that the claims made are
genuine. This still leaves a gap. Furthermore,
even in the absence of social ties, it is still
possible for firms to find financing. Thus we
concur with Shane and Cable (2002) that the
investor’s need for information is critical but
argue that, given the absence of fully under-
standable information (and often the existence
of scepticism about much that is being claimed
by potential investees), investors must also
rely on some proxy for the information desired
and the assessment that would have been
made of it.
Several writers have referred to the role of
trust in this context. Zucker (1986) distin-
guishes three sources of trust – reciprocal
interactions, social similarity and societal insti-
tutions. In the cases we are considering there
has frequently been no previous reciprocal
interaction between the parties and trust
seems to arise despite lack of social similarity
(e.g., between the financier and the ‘geek’,
perhaps even a ‘foreign geek’); only an institu-
tional basis remains to explain the trust. We
posit that such an institution can be found in
the form of reputation. Reputation serves as a
signal (Jervis, 1970; Zahra, 2005; Millar, Choi &
Millar, 2008; Schulz, Borghoff & Kraus, 2009),
which indicates to the potential investor that
the claims of the potential investee can be
relied upon. We acknowledge that other
factors play a role in the ultimate decision
whether or not to invest. However, ceteris
paribus reputation has the potential to give
assurance in situations of information asym-
metry and help overcome the problem of
finding finance.
Building reputation is key for any company
(Belanger, Hiller & Smith, 2002); reputation
has been defined as ‘the perceptions of the
organization shared by its multiple constituen-
cies over time’ (Fombrun, 2000; Fombrun &
van Riel, 2004; Alessandri, Yang & Kinsey,
2006). Suh and Houston (2010) argue that a
firm’s reputation (‘central, enduring, and dis-
tinctive corporate associations held by indi-
viduals outside of an organization’) is more
important than trust in impacting buyer–
supplier relationships – hence possibly also
investor–investee relationships. A good repu-
tation has to be earned. It is linked over time to
the image perceived by the various stakehold-
ers, and it is strategically important that the
image matches the organizational and market-
ing identity of the company and its chosen
positioning. Faced with information asymme-
try, the customer gives more credence to
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offerings from organizations which have
established reputations (Henard &Dacin, 2010;
Dolfsma, 2011).
Innovative SMEs like other, larger, compa-
nies can benefit from reputation in the market
as well: establishing reputation creates extra
receptiveness for their innovations; its benefits
are evidenced through in-depth studies of
reputation issues and their impact on company
profitability, ability to find markets for innova-
tions and, last but not least, on return on
investment (ROI) (e.g., Avnimelech & Teubal,
2008; Eisenegger & Imhof, 2008; Eisenegger,
2009; Vonwil & Wreschniok, 2009; Gligorijevic
& Leong, 2011).
Ethics and Exploitation
of Reputation
However, not all use of reputation is the same.
We distinguish three types of exploitation of
reputation:
(a) exploitation of reputation based on
performance
(b) exploitation of reputation by association
(c) reputational hype.
In some respects, reputation is similar to
the concept of ‘legitimacy’ (Rutherford, Buller
& Stebbins, 2009) – however, it goes beyond
merely bridging an initial credibility gap and
getting an audience, and creates a basis for
comparison (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). This
is of particular importance in the competitive
task of securing a share of a limited pool of
available investment or support.
Whilst reputation offers benefits, it also
demands responsibility. From an ethical point
of view, a company which has established a
good reputation as an innovator is in a power-
ful position. This brings the temptation to
exploit the easier life that comes with its own
success. Repeated overhyping of further inno-
vative products or unethically marketed inno-
vations will ultimately damage reputation but
in the meantime investors and/or customers
are duped. The scope for unethical conduct
exists and investors need to beware of this.
Reputation based on performance is a
salient and critical element in the success of
really innovative companies (Type I). It is,
however, characteristic of innovations that
most are ‘one-off’ and the innoSME seldom
has a ‘track record’ of successful innovations. It
is difficult, therefore, to distinguish between a
company which has the sound basis of a Type
I and a company which merely happens to
have had a success with a particular product
but has the defects of a Type II or Type III
company. In the early stages, when investment
is highly critical, the reputation arising from a
single success is often misleading. And in the
case of both Type II and Type III companies, it
is likely that the companies themselves are
convinced that the reputation is evidence of
their strengths even though that is not justi-
fied. Even the occasional failure does not settle
the matter, since it is the ability to sustain a
flow of innovative products that provides a
basis for building a reputation as an innovator
who can be trusted (Fukuyama, 1995). As long
as a high enough proportion of new products
are successful, there is a positive feedback
loop and reputation steadily grows.
Reputation by association is sought through
the participation in a company of individuals
who are respected or the presentation of
a business plan which is drawn up by a
respected consultancy, commercial links
with respected companies and participation in
respected networks (Zahra, 2005; Schulz,
Borghoff & Kraus, 2009). By assembling a port-
folio of respected people and organizations,
the innoSME benefits from their reputations.
Our observation is that none of this is likely to
reduce information asymmetry since no new
information and no new understanding of the
proposition need result. In a relatedway, inves-
tors, like customers, tend to trust a company if
it has a charismatic leader or one who has a
personal association with successful products
– even with other companies.
Reputational hype, consisting of claims and
forecasts which imply a degree of authority
and insight which is not justified, should be
seen as dishonesty. It may be seen as close to
some promotion that passes as acceptable in
consumer advertising and defended on the
grounds that once the audience becomes aware
that the company is not living up to its prom-
ises, the result is a loss of reputation which
should be a sufficient deterrent. The problem,
however, is that in the information asymmet-
ric context of investing in innovation, the
assessment of such claims is often made on the
basis of whether what is said corresponds to
what the hearer/investor believes to be true;
making claims and explaining proposals on
the basis of alleged mastery of a current new
technology or trend can make the innoSME
seem to be in this sense ‘correct’ and be per-
ceived as being trustworthy. In effect the
innoSME is being treated as reputable even
though it has only made claims and forecasts
and indulged in ‘blinding by science’.
The power of reputational hype is particu-
larly noticeable in market ‘bubble’ situations.
Type IV companies are those that particularly
benefit by parroting positive assessments of
potential benefits and extracting value, often
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in the form of grants and support, even though
they are conscious of their own defects. Type V
companies also benefit when the founders take
expert advice on developing business plans
and proof of concept presentations: investors
tend to persuade themselves that each pro-
posal that is in line with the accepted pattern is
one that will go well despite the lack of evi-
dence – and this leads to bubbles (Daniel, Hir-
shleifer & Teoh, 2002; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003;
Gisler, Sornette & Woodard, 2011).
The decision to invest may thus be strongly
influenced by reputational aspects, of the
people involved, of the technology they are
proposing to exploit, or of the network the
innoSME is part of. This makes it possible for
companies which lack the full set of competen-
cies and advantages identified above to
compete with more viable prospective busi-
nesses in attracting capital. Such a cause of
distortion applies to all of the three latter types
in our framework, but its impact is greatest
through the support it provides for the sea of
plankton companies in Type V.
The process has a striking similarity with
that in another market governed by asymmet-
ric information, the market for second-hand
cars as described by Akerlof in 1970 in his
seminal work ‘The Market for “Lemons” ’.
The results are similar for, for example, scien-
tific and technological innovations: the quality
of the invention or technology ceases to be the
basis for obtaining finance and a proposal
with a poor scientific basis (or even without
such a basis) and/or insufficient capacity to
succeed manages to get an investment due to
reputation not related to the actual innovation
and capacity. As a result, the process of
innovation financing become distorted and
unbalanced.
The Ethical Challenge
Bringing together the strands of information
asymmetry and reputational hype, we identify
the threat posed by the groups of SMEs which,
in spite of their fundamentally unsustainable
basis, manage to establish or prolong their
existence by generating unrealistic expecta-
tions on the part of investors. The shortcom-
ings described above are ones which exist at
the outset of the innoSME’s search for
funding; hence in principle it is possible to
enquire about them and in many cases take
account of them before funding is given. The
ability of innoSMEs to secure funding despite
shortcomings therefore requires explanation
and justification.
1. The body of management literature referred
to above pointing to causes of failure is so
substantial that we reject the conclusion
that it is wrong and is ignored simply
because investors who ignore it are as likely
to make successful investments as any
others.
2. A second possibility is that investors have
been aware of the investees’ deficiencies
and have invested in the expectation of
being able to compensate for these through
intervention or guidance. In this they
would take a view similar to that of support
mechanisms (e.g., those financed by gov-
ernments) which are typically set up on the
basis that deficiencies can be recognized
and once recognized can be compensated
for. Inasmuch as this perception is correct, it
follows that resources devoted to support-
ing Type II innoSMEs are a more economic
– and probably more effective – route
to promoting successful innovation than
resources devoted to Type III, IV or V
companies.
3. The third alternative is that investments
have been made without recognition of the
extent or nature of the deficiencies – as
would be the case if in a situation of infor-
mation asymmetry the investor had relied
on signals (Jervis, 1970).
The consequence in the latter two cases is that
when resources are devoted to Type III–V
innoSMEs, the level of successful innovation is
lower and resources are wasted in the sense
that they achieve less than was intended and
was possible.
We take the position that, from an ethical
point of view, it is important to minimize the
waste of resources and the disappointment –
not to mention other personal penalties – that
arise from investment and support being
directed at SME companies which do not
succeed. Viewed from the broader perspective
of a world in which innovation is a positive
force, support which is given to innoSMEs
which fail is a cause for concern as such. The
failures feed scepticism about the ability of
firms to innovate successfully (and insofar as
state support is publicly recognized, about
state support). While an ethical perspective is
often ignored in discussions of business evo-
lution we feel that the scope for deliberate
deceit and waste of precious resources in this
case makes it appropriate. In this we also
follow the example of Nijhof and Fisscher in
placing business studies in the context of a
socially responsible world view (Nijhof, Fiss-
cher & Looise, 2002).
While we are aware of the argument that
entrepreneurs who ‘bend the rules’ may be
able to justify their actions in terms of virtue
ethics (Brenkert, 2009), this is not a widely sup-
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ported view and we do not believe that the
differences among the variety of ethical
systems proposed otherwise in a business
context make a great difference in the cases we
describe. A suitable reference point for assess-
ing ethical acceptability would be a ‘rule-
utilitarian’ ethic, i.e., one which places the
highest value on the achievement of outcomes
beneficial to human society but combines this
with the need to seek out rules of conduct –
and which thereby ‘does a better job than its
rivals of matching and tying together our
moral convictions, as well as offering us help
with our moral disagreements and uncertain-
ties’ (Hooker, 2000). We do not believe that a
rule permitting deliberate deception can be
accommodated in such a framework, and also
feel that virtue if not rules will prescribe
caution rather than unfettered abandon in ini-
tiating ventures which could be harmful
to others either directly or through societal
effects.
Support for innovation is a transfer of
resources from the rest of the economy
towards a particular group of companies. This
applies even if the resources come from inves-
tors rather than the state. The justification for
this in economic terms depends on the effec-
tiveness with which the transferred resources
are targeted; if this is poor then the resources
might be better left with those from whom
they were obtained, or used in other ways.
Similarly from a consequentialist ethical view-
point – including most varieties of utilitarian-
ism – it is undesirable, hence unethical, to
create a situation in which such sub-optimal
decisions are taken, since they reduce the
future well-being of the community. There
is an ethical imperative to avoid this as long
as that does not lead to a greater adverse
consequence.
In the case of innoSMEs specifically, where
such firms are the brainchild of individuals
and where they commit both resources and
self-respect to the endeavour, the personal loss
resulting from misplaced encouragement and
support needs to be added to the economic
dis-benefit. We point to the existence of alto-
gether large numbers of companies in Types
III, IV and V and pose the question whether
support for these results is justified in ethical
terms.
There is not only the direct consequence to
consider. In addition to the indefensibility
from the viewpoint of utilitarian ethics of
funding organizations that will inevitably fail,
we also note that such failure increases the
prevalence of poor average performance
which in turn raises barriers to genuine, valu-
able and potentially successful innovation
through higher cost of capital and less open-
ness to innovations among customers. Further-
more, the effect of directing investment and
support towards enterprises which seek to
emulate those who achieved rapid and spec-
tacular rewards from their innovations will, in
our view, steer the balance of aspirations in
society in the direction of securing high
rewards from exclusive proprietorial innova-
tions, and away from open, co-operative rela-
tionships and reward based on diligence,
commitment and competences. It is to be
expected that this will lead to individuals with
the latter values being undervalued and even
having difficulty in finding institutions in
which they can work effectively.
Our conclusion is that the information
asymmetry that is inherent in the innovation
context creates a serious dilemma, a tempta-
tion to unethical behaviour, and that reputa-
tion, ceteris paribus, is an inadequate basis for
making investment or purchasing decisions.
The typology of innovative SMEs we have
developed highlights the risks of ignoring this,
particularly as it can lead to an unethical allo-
cation of resources.
Implications
Given the ethical as well as economic issues at
stake, there is a strong imperative to conduct
further research which may throw light on the
early warning signs that can indicate probable
failure and research which can explain the
behaviour of investors when faced with infor-
mation asymmetry.
While investors and governments continue
to have a direct self-interest in this area, the
academic communitymight contribute by pro-
viding a broader theoretical framework. This
might be assisted by revisiting techniques for
comparative assessment of companies’ future
performance that have fallen from favour or
are found too complex for non-academic audi-
ences. In particular, it could be useful to con-
sider an extended version of the analysis once
applied by Michael Robert Milken to evaluate
the performance of ‘blue chip’ companies as
compared to companies below the investment
grade, which resulted in the so-called junk
bonds (Sobel, 1993).
We also draw attention to one of the impor-
tant tools in creativity management, the
Theory of Inventive Problem Solving, also
known as TRIZ. Whilst it was initially
designed to assist inventors and engineers in
the solution of technical problems, currently
the area of applicability of TRIZ has gone far
beyond the border of engineering science.
TRIZ was successfully applied to reputational
analysis (Lin, Lee & Dadura, 2011), where the
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authors used the TRIZ contradiction matrix to
determine inventive principles to formulate
strategies for reputation analysis in certain
branches of industry.Whilst this is one particu-
lar example of using TRIZ outside its main
areas of technology-related applications, the
number of these examples is growing, espe-
cially in the South-East Asia context (Lee
& Leu, 2010; Zouaoua et al., 2010; Breja &
Banwet, 2011; Zhang & Sang, 2011; Zhang &
Zhang, 2011).
Through the development of analytical
and TRIZ-like expert frameworks and using
appropriately trained professionals (Medina,
Lavado & Cabrera, 2005; Moehrle, 2005; Alves
et al., 2007; Zhang & Xu, 2007; Forest &
Faucheux, 2011; Gadd, 2011), it is argued that
a procedure may be developed which will
perhaps not reveal all the best candidates for
investment, nor by definition create innovative
champions, but would more effectively elimi-
nate much undesirable ‘noise’ from the inno-
vative investment market.
Conclusions, Limitations and Areas
for Further Research
Innovations are important, but many innova-
tive SMEs that receive funding then fail. In the
meantime, many others are unable to find
funding or support. The ability of firms to
attract support even though they lack the
basics to succeed requires explanation and
evaluation. We analysed the concept of infor-
mation asymmetry and pointed to its special
relevance in the case of innoSMEs’ relationship
with investors. Information asymmetry was
seen to be relevant in two ways:
(a) Investors are often unable to verify claims
about the quality of the innovation or the
company and are thus led astray – whether
deliberately or not.
(b) A proxy/signal for the quality of an
innoSME, available in the form of reputa-
tion, allows companies to secure support
despite relative secrecy about matters that
might deter the investor.
We reported on a typology of innoSMEs which
emerged from an on-going business perfor-
mance analysis of 120 innoSMEs that had been
successful in obtaining funding and were able
to bring the above points to life by discussing
the way in which they made possible the
progress of companies across the range covered
by the typology.We noted that the behaviour of
those promoting innoSMEs which had poor or
no prospects of success need not always be
unethical in that entrepreneurs have been
shown to be prone to unrealistic expectations
and referred in passing to Brenkert (2009)’s
view that a strict rule-based ethic is not always
appropriate. It appeared that deliberate decep-
tion – Type IV companies – was rarer than
excessive hype and self-deception.
None the less, the high proportion of poten-
tial investees with poor prospects results in the
investment market coming under pressure,
which we see as ‘noise’ interfering with its
optimal functioning. We therefore argued that
given the nature of the innovation process and
of the founders and promoters of innoSMEs,
investors need to take account of the danger of
diverting resources which it would be more
ethical to direct elsewhere. We argued that a
better understanding of information asymme-
try and its significance in this area could lead
to the development of better tools for selecting
innoSMEs for investment. Our conclusion is
that there is an argument based on economics
and ethics for more research in this area and,
in the meantime, a better recognition of the
dangers of information asymmetry in the form
of a relevant critical assessment of the informa-
tion provided by those seeking funding.
For innovative SMEs we conclude that, in an
environment where there is competition for
support, there is value in establishing reputa-
tion, particularly where the technical or IPR
nature of the proposed innovationmakes it dif-
ficult for investors to validate claims. While
reliance on reputation may be subjected to
greater scrutiny, as long as the proportion of
successes is sufficient, there is a positive feed-
back loop. These considerations also bring into
focus the responsibilities of innovative compa-
nies. The links between social responsibility of
innovative companies, their ability to innovate
and to show outstanding business perfor-
mance are not always clear, but they do exist
(Fisscher & Nijhof, 2005; Fisscher et al., 2005).
For the entrepreneurs and executives of inno-
SMEs, there is a need to reflect or conduct
internal ethical dialogue (Nijhof, Fisscher &
Looise, 2000) about both the methods and the
wider effects of their attempts to obtain
funding.
There is a limitation to this paper in as much
as it invokes a perspective on the causes of
corporate failure which is normally applied to
firms much larger than the innovative SMEs
considered here. The discussion of informa-
tion asymmetry is also framed at a general
level rather than considering the different
types of information that are relevant to the
information decision. We accept that there is
also information asymmetry in the opposite
direction between the innoSME and the inves-
tor inasmuch as the investor is better informed
as to general availability of finance and the
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conditions that can be attached to an invest-
ment. None the less, we believe that the phe-
nomenon of excessive failure rates and the
relevance of information asymmetry are well
enough established to merit consideration of
whether the arguments here are of general
validity.
The typology used to illustrate the situation
addressed by our ethical concerns may also be
considered a limitation. While it was based on
researching the operations of 120 innovative
SMEs in the technology field in Europe and
the USA, results – particularly as regards the
proportions of firms of each of the types – may
be different in other innovative areas and
further research on such topics would be
justified.
In the choice of paradigm for our ethical
considerations we believe that we have
aligned ourselves with the approaches most
consistent with current CSR and other busi-
ness thought. However, it is conceivable that
some virtue ethics and rule-based approaches
could reject the need for further research on
those providing investment and support on
the grounds that their actions need to be based
on principles that are independent of out-
comes and consequences and that the only
ethical issues are for the innoSMEs. A strand
of ethical research on innoSMEs might none
the less be called for to consider the obliga-
tions of innoSMEs, and this could include the
question of whether they ought not to be
attempting to raise funds if they lack the char-
acteristics to succeed.
As is argued in the conclusions above,
further research is also justified on the signals,
indices and proxies used by investors to over-
come information asymmetry problems and
on the extent and nature of would-be invest-
ees’ responses in the form of manipulation of
such signals as reputation.We referred to some
techniques from investment analysis which
might form the starting point for improved
evaluation techniques, e.g., TRIZ.
We suggest that consideration of approaches
to information asymmetry coupled with our
categorization forms a useful starting point for
testing theory development in this area and
as indicated above we are continuing our
research in understanding better the intrica-
cies of the five innovation types distinguished.
Note
1. We recognize that companies with a sophisti-
cated understanding of patent law may pursue
different disclosure strategies as competitive
weapons, but this is generally not relevant for or
appealing to SMEs with limited funds.
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